US President Donald Trump’s visit to China, which he had postponed due to the Strait of Hormuz War, will take place on 14–15 May. This means that at least this phase of the Strait of Hormuz War has come to an end. 

Because the Hormuz War, or the US attack on Iran, was ultimately the beginning of the US’s attack on Asia. Whenever the US finds an opportunity, it will wish to continue pursuing a ‘policy of force’ against Asia. Of course, Iran’s effective response has significantly narrowed the US’s window of opportunity.

Trump’s hand is weakened

It is clear that the Strait of Hormuz War, in its current form, has dealt the US a very critical defeat. 

In the context of US-China relations, this means that Trump is now approaching China with a weaker hand than he would have had had he not postponed his original timeline. 

The US has been defeated in Iran; Trump has suffered a political loss in Iran. This means Trump will be in a weaker position when facing Chinese President Xi Jinping.

On a broader scale, the implication is this: the US failed to win the trade war against China, and subsequently, Trump’s sanctions failed to yield results because Beijing refused to back down. 

On top of this, it is now far more difficult for a US defeated in Iran to exert pressure on China than it was yesterday.

Political leverage

The backdrop to Trump’s visit to China is economic-political, and his primary aim is to balance trade with China and limit China’s trade capacity. 

The US is not achieving this solely through economic means—such as raising customs tariffs—but is also attempting to use political tools as leverage. 

These political levers include: its military presence in Japan and South Korea; cooperation with countries like the Philippines and Australia against China; the Uighur issue; and the Taiwan question. 

However, the US has also suffered setbacks regarding these political tools in the Strait of Hormuz. 

The ‘American deterrence’ problem

The US, which has been defeated in Iran, whose security umbrella for its allies is ineffective, which cannot win a regional war without allied support, and which faces difficulties in replenishing its stockpiles, has seen its capacity to use its available cards more effectively weakened. 

For example, the question ‘If the US cannot protect its bases in Arab countries against Iran, how can it protect its bases on our soil against China?’ is now on the agenda of the Japanese and South Koreans. In these countries, those advocating hostility towards China by aligning with US strategy are losing ground, whilst those seeking to develop independent and good relations with China are gaining strength.

Consequently, a US defeat in Iran will weaken the military encirclement strategy Washington is attempting to impose on China.

The US’s futile move on Taiwan

Let us turn to the main issue: Taiwan. For China, the precondition for any kind of relationship or cooperation with the US is Taiwan—the “One China” policy. Consequently, this is also part of the issue surrounding Trump’s visit. 

The US officially accepts the “One China” policy but, contrary to the agreements it has signed, is attempting to develop a different kind of relationship with Taiwan. The US does not recognise Taiwan as an independent country but ensures that 11 island states—most of which are effectively its satellites—recognise Taiwan. 

A visit by a “Taiwanese leader” has been planned to Eswatini, the only African country to recognise Taiwan. This visit, taking place ahead of Trump’s visit to China, is nothing more than a message from Washington that “I hold the Taiwan card”. To bring a “Taiwanese leader” onto the international stage precisely whilst Cheng Li-wun, leader of Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang, is visiting Beijing to meet Xi Jinping and deliver a message of “sowing the seeds of peace” is a typical American move.

With the difference that Washington’s efforts now hold no strategic value.