The initial tactic pursued by the US in its attack on Iran alongside Israel was as follows: they would bomb Iran intensively, this time, unlike in the 12-Day War, directly eliminating its leader, and the headless Iranian state apparatus would begin to unravel. Then, the people, who had already risen up against the regime a short time before, would revolt again, thus toppling the regime... 

This White House tactic failed for two reasons: 

Firstly, Khamenei was Iran's leader, but Iran did not have a "one-man regime". The Iranian regime consists of many intertwined institutions and councils that are difficult to understand using Western codes. Therefore, the US killing Khamenei did not create any vacuum in the state mechanism. 

Secondly, there was a misinterpretation of the Iranian people. Yes, the Iranian people were dynamic, rising up almost every year demanding democracy against the regime. But when their country was under attack from the US and Israel, the Iranian people tended to unite.

It could not directly drag the Gulf into war

The US's second tactic was to mobilise the Gulf countries against Iran. But this tactic has also failed, at least so far. This is because Iran, through clever diplomacy, constantly emphasised that it was targeting US bases in the Gulf countries, not the Gulf countries themselves. And rightly so. The US was attacking Iran from its bases in the Gulf, not from Texas, and Iran was responding in accordance with international law. 

Attacks on locations other than US bases or addresses directly linked to the US and Israel are viewed with suspicion by both Tehran and, to some extent, the capitals of the Gulf countries. Such attacks are interpreted as aiming to provoke the Gulf countries against Iran. 

As a result, the US has not been able to directly involve the Gulf countries in the war so far.

U-turn on the Kurdish card

The third tactic pursued by the US and Israel was to provoke Türkiye and Azerbaijan against Iran. The missile detected(?) and shot down(?) by NATO and the drones that fell on Azerbaijan/Nakhchivan are also suspicious. Iran has already stated that it did not target Türkiye and Azerbaijan. With these successive events, a section of public opinion in Türkiye, but also the government in Azerbaijan, could be provoked against Iran to a certain extent. Fortunately, Ankara's approach seems to have restrained Baku. 

The fourth tactic pursued by the US and Israel was to use the Kurdish card, to open a Kurdish front from Iraq to Iran. The Netanyahu administration had already been working on the Barzanis for some time for this purpose. It emerged that Trump had also met with Barzani and Talabani during this process. Indeed, Trump openly stated, "It would be great if the Kurdish forces launched an attack against Iran. I would fully support it." However, Trump received two critical responses. Shanz Ibrahim Ahmed, wife of the Iraqi President and aunt of KYB leader Bafel Talabani, said, "The Kurds are not mercenaries." The next day, speaking to the US media, Bafel Talabani also said, "Kurdistan should not be the spearhead of the war." 

During this process, the Kurdish people in Iran's Kurdistan province staged demonstrations in defence of their country against the US and Israel, Tehran warned Kurdish organisations, and Ankara's diplomacy with its counterparts, due to the regional risks that would arise if the "Kurdish card" were played, also proved effective. Trump made a U-turn from what he said three days ago: "We don't want to make the war more complicated than it already is. The Kurds are eager to go in, but I told them I don't want them to go in."

Mussolini talks a lot

At least so far, none of these four US tactics have worked; they have failed. Moreover, the US has not received the support it wanted from allies such as Britain and France. A NATO and EU member country like Spain has taken a position against the US and Israel, giving a lesson in humanity and morality.

Trump, who watched the war unfold without saying much in the first few days, is now talking constantly, most likely because of this failure. As Nazım says in his Eighth Letter to Taranta-Babu: "Mussolini talks too much, Taranta-Babu / he talks too much because he is very afraid!"