Trump’s ambition to “take” Greenland is not new for the United States, but today it carries a different meaning. Trump, who denies climate change, wants the island even more now because warming in the Arctic has made the seas around Greenland suitable for navigation. The need to ensure the security of maritime routes—important not only for the security of states and alliances, but also for America’s global dominance—and the fact that this sea route would make it easier for China’s “New Silk Road” project to reach world markets are pushing Trump toward an aggressive approach. To this, one must add the zones of influence (sectors) that some countries claim based on their projections over the North and South Pole regions. One of the largest sectors in the Arctic belongs to Denmark because of Greenland. The United States, by contrast, has only a small area stemming from Alaska. Trump’s desire to make Canada the 51st state may also be driven by the idea of expanding that sector.

WHAT RUSSIA COULDN’T DO

Trump, even if not convincingly, is trying to link his Greenland policy to the growing interest of Russia and China in the Arctic and the threat this creates. Even if such a threat exists, it would be more appropriate for it to be addressed as NATO. Indeed, Britain, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have stated that Trump’s Greenland threat carries the risk of a “dangerous downward spiral” and weakens transatlantic relations. France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Britain sent troops to Greenland—reconnaissance-oriented and symbolic, but “to contribute to Denmark’s security.” France also stated openly that it would join this force “against the American threat Denmark faces.” Thus, for the first time in NATO’s history, a group of the alliance’s members declared that they perceived a threat from another member—moreover, a founding and leading member—and that they felt the need to act against it. Putin owes a debt of gratitude to Trump, who has brought NATO to the point of disintegration in one year by doing what Russia could not do in 70 years.

EVEN ITS DOME IS GOLD

Those who examine Trump’s policies and personality point out that he behaves like a merchant. Steps such as imposing high customs tariffs aimed at economically collapsing the EU, and pressuring it to increase defence spending, fit the description of “behaving like a merchant.” Trump sees oil, precious minerals, and gold everywhere and thinks that only he (the United States) should own them. In Greenland, he says he will build a missile defence shield called the “Golden Dome.” Even Trump’s missile dome is gold. And Trump declares that he recognises no law, rule, or order, and that he “no longer feels obliged to think only about peace (!).”

DANGEROUS TIMES

Trump’s policies show that the world is being dragged toward a new order without rules or law, or more accurately, toward chaos. As the periods before the two world wars showed, such times are periods when those who govern states most easily make errors of judgment. And the smallest mistake can lead to major conflicts. Indeed, these mistakes are being made today. Today, the world is one in which a new world war has, in places, begun and continues—Ukraine in Europe; Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in the Middle East; local wars in places like Sudan and Somalia in Africa; sometimes as an occupation without conflict, such as Venezuela; and sometimes, like Greenland and Taiwan, still on the political and diplomatic level. Although Trump gives the impression that he has stepped back because he has seen that the cost could be high due to the U.S. midterm elections in November 2026, Iran’s ability to respond, and reactions developing around the world against Trump’s policies, we can also place Trump’s stance toward Iran in the category of aggression that is still at the political and diplomatic preparation stage.

WHAT SHOULD TURKEY DO?

NATO, which Turkey has seen as the main pillar of its security since 1952, is no longer the old NATO. It is on its way to becoming an organisation that member states can use, in a manner incompatible with the definition of an “alliance,” to implement policies that even threaten one another’s territorial integrity and state unity. Indeed, leaving Greece aside, even the United States, which has been considered a “strategic partner” for years, is not an ally Turkey can trust. The United States’ policies on Syria, the PKK/SDG, the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and its cooperation with the Greek Cypriot Administration are clear proof of this.

Turkey must take measures by accepting that it is at an important crossroads and may ultimately have to go its own way, alone. The National Struggle and the war for economic independence, carried out and won against external and internal enemies under much harsher conditions and with far fewer means, should guide us.